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QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an employee because he or she opposed 
discrimination forbidden by Title VII. The lower courts are 
divided as to how such anti-retaliation provisions apply to 
management officials, such as personnel or EEO officials, 
whose duties include assuring compliance with Title VII 
or implementing an employer’s anti-discrimination policy.
The question presented is:
Are management officials:
(1) subject to exclusion from protection under 
section 704(a) if their actions are within the scope 
of their official duties (the rule in the Fifth, Eighth, 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits),
(2) protected under section 704(a) regardless of 
whether their actions are within the scope of their 
official duties (the rule in the Sixth and District of 
Columbia Circuits), or
(3) subject to exclusion from protection under 
section 704(a) if their actions are not within the 
scope of their official duties (the rule in the Ninth 
Circuit)?
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1Petitioner Janet Brush respectfully prays that this 
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the judgment 
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals entered 
on March 26, 2012.
OPINIONS BELOW
The March 26, 2012 opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
which is reported at 466 Fed.Appx. 781 (11th Cir. 2012), 
is set out at pp. la-16a of the Appendix. The May 31,
2012 order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing 
and rehearing en banc, which is not reported, is set out 
at pp. 42a-43a of the Appendix. The January 14, 2011 
Order of the District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, which is not reported, is set out at pp. 17a-41a of 
the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered 
on March 26, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc was denied on May 31,2012. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees . . . because he has opposed 
any practice, made an unlawful employment 
practice by this title, or because he has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
2any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The courts of appeals are divided regarding whether 
the anti-retaliation provisions of federal employment 
laws protect personnel and other management officials 
whose job responsibilities include assuring compliance 
with those statutes. In the instant case a Sears employee 
complained to her employer that she had been sexually 
harassed; there is no dispute that section 704(a) of 
Title VII protected the harassment victim herself from 
retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that 
section 704(a) did not protect petitioner—the key Sears 
official who notified others of the complaint, unearthed 
the nature of the harassment, and pressed the company 
to take speedier and more aggressive action in response. 
The Court of Appeals applied to petitioner’s section 704(a) 
retaliation claim a court-made “manager rule” exception 
to federal anti-retaliation laws. The Sixth and District of 
Columbia Circuits have expressly rejected that limitation 
on the protections of section 704(a).
(1) The Events Giving Rise to This Action
At the time of the events giving rise to this action, 
Brush worked for Sears as a Loss Prevention District 
Coach. Her job was to reduce a variety of risks to 
the company, particularly losses due to theft. In mid- 
September 2007, Brush received a call late one evening 
on her cell phone from Mrs. Doe1, whom she had known
1. Because of the seriousness of the conduct alleged, we refer 
to the victim and harasser respectively as “Mrs. Doe” and the 
“Store Coach,” rather than using their actual names.
3for many years.2 Mrs. Doe reported to Brush that she was 
being sexually harassed by her Store Coach (Sears’ title 
for a store manager), but provided few details. Brush gave 
this information to higher ranking Sears officials, who 
decided to suspend the Store Coach, and directed that 
Scott Reuter (a District Manager) interview Mrs. Doe 
and other possible witnesses. (App. 5a, 20a-21a). Brush 
accompanied Reuter, although her responsibility was 
largely limited to taking notes and serving as a witness 
to whatever was said in response to Reuter’s questions.3
Mrs. Doe, when interviewed by Reuter (accompanied 
by Brush), provided some information about the sexual 
harassment, but Brush concluded that Mrs. Doe was not 
revealing the full extent of the harassment because she 
was uncomfortable speaking with Reuter, a man whom 
Doe did not know. After Reuter’s questioning had ended 
and Mrs. Doe had left the room, Brush told Reuter that she 
intended to speak with Doe alone, and Reuter acquiesced.4 
(App. 5a). When questioned by Brush outside Reuter’s 
presence, Mrs. Doe disclosed the gravity of what had 
occurred.
I said, “[Mrs. Doe], did you tell Scott the whole 
story?’ That’s all I said. [Mrs. Doe] looked 
down to the ground and just started crying 
hysterically. And said, “No, Janet, I didn’t tell 
Scott the whole story. [The Store Coach] raped 
me three times in the loft.”5
2. Complaint H 43.
3. Brush Dep., 9.
4. Brush Dep., 72, 98; Complaint, 111 35, 42.
5. Brush Dep., 73.
4Mrs. Doe indicated she did not want her husband to find 
out about the attacks (App. 5a); there was conflicting 
evidence regarding what if anything Mrs. Doe said about 
not telling others.6
Brush reported Doe’s statement to Reuter, and 
together they called their supervisor, Bob Church. Brush 
pressed Church to take action, suggesting that Sears 
contact the police, contending that she was not competent 
to investigate charges of such criminal acts. Church, 
however, declined to do so, explaining he wanted to talk 
to “Legal.” In a conversation the next day, Brush again 
pressed Church in vain to take some further action.7 Brush 
concluded that Church had “brushed [the rape report] 
under the rug.”8 Brush later explained that she wanted 
Sears to do more because “we were not taking care of 
our associates.”9
6. Brush testified that Mrs. Doe asked only that Brush not 
tell Doe’s husband. According to Brush, Doe did not object when 
Brush indicated she would have to notify her superiors. (Brush 
Dep. 73). On Brush’s account the issue of contacting the police or 
any others never arose during her interview with Doe. (Brush 
Dep., 73-75). Doe described the exchange differently, stating that 
she “asked [Brush] not to say nothing because I didn’t want the 
police involved.” (Doe Dep., 15). The District Court noted that “[e] 
xactly what occurred during this interview is in dispute.” (App. 12a 
n. 3). The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded that 
there was an express discussion about the police (not merely a 
general request that no one be told about the rapes), and that Doe 
had specifically asked that the police not be notified. (App. 5a).
7. Brush Dep., 76-77.
8. Brush Dep., 6, 85.
9. Brush Dept., 85.
5In early October, after interviewing both Mrs. Doe 
and the Store Coach, Church met with Brush. When 
Church suggested that the Store Coach had merely 
engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with Mrs. 
Doe, Brush vehemently disagreed, insisting that Doe was 
“visibly frightened of this man.” Brush rejected on the 
same ground Church’s suggestion that Mrs. Doe had been 
trying to cover up a consensual relationship with the Store 
Coach because of his race. Shortly after this meeting, the 
Store Coach was fired. (App. 5a). There were no further 
discussions about the matter between Brush and other 
Sears officials, until after Brush was dismissed.10
On November 20, 2007, Sears fired Brush. (Id.). She 
was told at the time that the reason for the dismissal was 
that she had violated Sears policy when she unearthed 
the rapes, because at the time Brush re-interviewed 
Mrs. Doe she was not accompanied by Mr. Reuter. 
(App.6a and n. 4).11 Brush filed a Title VII charge with 
the EEOC, alleging that she had been dismissed because 
of the actions she had taken in unearthing and seeking 
to correct the harassment of Mrs. Doe. The EEOC made 
a cause finding (App. 6a), concluding that Brush had 
indeed been “terminated in retaliation for engaging in 
protected activity.” The Commission found that Sears 
“was unhappy with the way [Brush] asked the questions 
and embarrassed at the way she handled the matter.. . .
10. Brush Dep., 92-94.
11. Sears’ printed “Guide on How To Investigate” states 
“ [h]aving a witness (another coach) present during the interview 
is helpful (but not necessary) to prevent conflicting statements 
and avoid issues with uncooperative parties.” (Doc. 32-24, p. 30; 
Doc. 38-11, p. 3 (Emphasis added)).
6[Sears] negatively viewed her participation in the sexual 
harassment investigation and terminated her employment 
under pretextual reasons.”12
(2) The Proceedings Below
Brush filed suit in district court, asserting that she 
had been fired “because she uncovered that Defendant 
had negligently allowed three forcible rapes to occur on its 
premises,” and “because she raised rape issues that would 
have been kept hidden if she had allowed Mr. Reuter to 
conduct the interviews.” (Complaint, ITU 59, 60; App. 6a). 
That retaliation, the complaint asserted, violated section 
704(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Sears moved for summary judgment, arguing inter 
alia that section 704(a) did not forbid retaliation against 
Brush because of the so-called “manager rule.”13 The 
District Court agreed. Brush’s retaliation claim was 
barred, the District Court held, by the manager rule 
applied in several circuits, because Brush was acting 
within the scope of her employment when she opposed 
the sexual harassment of Mrs. Doe. (App. 28a-31a).14
12. Doc. 38-4, p. 2.
13. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion 
for Summary Final Judgment, p. 9(“plaintiff cannot establish 
protected activity because the alleged activity occurred in the 
course of performing her job duties.”)(capitalization omitted); see 
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Final Judgment, pp. 4-5.
14. The District Court also granted summary judgment on 
other grounds. The Court of Appeals did not reach those other 
issues, which thus are not relevant at this stage in the proceedings.
7“[T]he rule . . . forecloses oppositional activity claims 
by managers who are simply performing their duties.” 
(App. 31a; see 30a(“the long line of cases that preclude a 
finding of protected activity when the activity occurs in 
the course of performing one’s job duties”) ). Plaintiff’s 
actions were unprotected since they “occurred during the 
course of the performance of her job.” (App. 28a). In light 
of the manager rule, the District Judge insisted, Brush’s 
assertion that “she ‘disapproved’ of the store manager’s 
alleged rape is meaningless.” (App. 30a).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground, 
adopting and applying a version of the “manager rule” 
utilized in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. Under that rule, 
the Court of Appeals explained, an official who opposes 
discrimination against someone else is not protected from 
retaliation by section 704(a) if that opposition was within 
“the scope of [the official’s] employment.” (App. 14 n. 8). 
“[W]e find the ‘manager rule’ persuasive and a viable 
prohibition against certain individuals recovering under 
Title VII.” (App. 13a). “[T]he ‘manager rule’ holds that a 
management employee that, in the course of her normal 
job performance, disagrees with or opposes the actions of 
an employer does not engage in ‘protected activity.’” (App. 
12a). Regardless of whether Brush personally opposed 
sexual harassment or wanted to correct or prevent such 
abuse, the Eleventh Circuit held, under the manager rule 
the actions that Brush took were not “protected activity” 
under section 704(a) because her “job responsibilities 
involved exactly the type of actions that Brush took on 
Mrs. Doe’s behalf.” (App.l3a).
8The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
[t]hrough discovery, Brush produced evidence 
that showed she “opposed the alleged sexual 
battery [experienced by Mrs. Doe], explained 
[to her employer, Sears] that the seriousness of 
those allegations required police intervention, 
and that she wanted to call the Orange County 
Police.”
(App. 6a)(additions in opinion)(quoting appellate brief).
Brush also provided some circumstantial 
evidence that her termination may have been 
related to her involvement in the internal 
investigation conducted by Sears. In particular, 
she cited a declaration by her former boss,
. . . who stated that he “believe[d] Ms. Brush 
was terminated because of her involvement in 
uncovering and opposing rapes that took place 
on [Sears’] property.”
(App. 7a). But because of the manager rule, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that this evidence was legally irrelevant.
Brush filed a timely petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc. The petition was denied on May 31, 
2012. (App. 42a-43a).
9REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THE CIRCUITS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER 
THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF A “MANAGER 
RULE” EXCEPTION TO SECTION 704(a) AND 
OTHER FEDERAL ANTI-RETALIATION LAWS
This case presents a complex circuit conflict regarding 
whether the anti-retaliation provisions in federal 
employment statutes apply to management officials 
whose responsibilities include reporting, investigating, 
or preventing violations of those laws. The question has 
arisen most often, as here, with regard to section 704(a) of 
Title VII, which prohibits retaliation against any employee 
who opposes discrimination forbidden by Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “[C]ourts have long acknowledged 
the difficult situation of reconciling the language of Title 
VII with the dismissal of an employee whose job it is to 
handle discrimination complaints.” Schanfield v. Sojitz 
Corp. of America, 663 F.Supp. 2d 305,342 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(footnote omitted).
The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted a “manager rule,” under which an official may 
be denied the protections of a statutory anti-retaliation 
provision if his or her actions are within the scope of 
the official’s duties. The Sixth and District of Columbia 
Circuits have rejected the manager rule, holding that 
anti-retaliation provisions such as section 704(a) accord the 
same protection to managers, supervisors and personnel 
officials that they provide to other workers. The courts of 
appeals that do utilize the manager rule disagree among 
themselves about whether the rule applies to an official 
who—although acting within the scope of his or her
10
responsibilities—is attempting to assist a particular 
employee or group of employees. The Ninth Circuit 
applies a standard that is essentially the opposite of the 
manager rule, holding that a manager can be denied the 
protection of an anti-retaliation provision because his or 
her conduct was outside the scope of his or her employment 
and adverse to the interest of the employer.
In the lower courts, the manager rule is not tied to 
the text of the statute involved, but is treated as a federal 
common law of retaliation. In addition to Title VII, the 
rule has been applied to a wide variety of other federal 
statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act15, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act16, the Uniformed Services
15. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d 617 (5th Cir. 
2008); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F. 3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996).
16. In Clemons v. Nike, Inc., 2007 WL 2890972 (D.Or. Sept. 
28), the plaintiff, an employee relations specialist, was assigned 
the task of finding a reasonable accommodation under the ADA 
for an employee who was losing his sight. When initial efforts 
to find another position were unsuccessful, the plaintiff was 
directed to dismiss the disabled worker. The plaintiff responded 
that the disabled worker and the company “needed more time 
to engage in the [legally required] interactive process [under 
the ADA],” 2007 WL 2890972 at *3, and that “ to terminate 
the employee, in the middle of the interactive process to find 
a reasonable accommodation, violated the ADA.” Id. at *9. 
The employer agreed to allow another week and a half to find 
another job for the disabled worker, but then fired the plaintiff. 
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation 
claim on the ground that, in seeking to assure compliance with 
the ADA, “ Clemons was performing her job.” Id.at *10. In 
the court below Sears relied on the decision in Clemons as an 
example of the manager rule. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law 
In Support of Its Motion For Summary Final Judgment, p. 9.
11
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act17, the Family 
and Medical Leave Act18, the Sarbanes Oxley Act19, and 
Title IX.20 These decisions most often rely on opinions 
construing other federal statutes, and are not based on 
the purpose or text of the particular provision at issue. 
Federal courts have also applied the manager rule to 
claims under state anti-retaliation statutes, relying on 
the federal court-fashioned manager-rule doctrine rather 
than on the text or purpose of, or state court decisions 
regarding, the state statute at issue.21 Thus, while the 
instant appeal concerns whether a “manager rule” limits 
the protections of section 704(a) of Title VII, this case has 
important implications for a broad range of federal anti­
retaliation statutes.
A. The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
Have Adopted A Court-Created “Manager Rule” 
Exception to Section 704(a) and Other Federal 
Anti-Retaliation Statutes
The essence of the manager rule is to deny to certain 
officials protections that would be accorded to the direct
17. Cook v. CTC Communications Corp., 2007 WL 3284337 
at *9-*10 (D.N.H. Oct. 30).
18. Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC, 2011 WL 
3803789 at *12 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 29).
19. Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, 2011 WL 4348298 
(M.D.Tenn. Sept. 16).
20. Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 635 F.Supp. 2d 581 
(E.D.Pa. 2009).
21. See Hill v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2997556 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 12).
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victim of an unlawful employment practice. There is no 
dispute that in the instant case section 704(a) would have 
protected Mrs. Doe if she herself had taken the actions in 
which Brush engaged—reporting sexual harassment to 
Brush’s supervisor, insisting that Doe be interviewed by 
Brush alone, pressing Sears to act with greater dispatch, 
urging that the police be contacted, and maintaining 
that Doe’s sexual contacts with the Store Coach were not 
consensual. The question presented is whether section 
704(a) protected Brush when she did so.
(1) Under the Eleventh Circuit’s version of the 
manager rule, actions that would be protected if engaged 
in by a discrimination victim are not protected if taken 
by an official who was “neither directly interested in the 
underlying discrimination nor acting beyond the scope 
of her employment in opposing an employer’s action.” 
(App. 14a n. 8). Under the manager rule an official who 
opposes harassment of or discrimination against other 
employees can be retaliated against for having done so 
if that opposition occurs “in the course of her normal 
job performance.” (App. 12a). Thus, under the Eleventh 
Circuit decision, the “actions that Brush took on Mrs. 
Doe’s behalf” (App. 13a)—actions that would have been 
protected if engaged in by Doe herself (or by a mere co­
worker)—were not protected by section 704(a) because 
Brush had acted “as a manager.” (Id.).
The Court of Appeals based the manager rule on 
its view that the protection created by section 704(a) 
was intended, at least primarily, for opposition activity 
engaged in by the specific victim of the harassment or 
other discriminatory practice. Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S.
13
271 (2009), sets out the definitive account of what types 
of actions and statements are protected by section 704(a). 
But, the Eleventh Circuit insisted, Crawford only applies 
to acts of and statements by discrimination victims 
themselves. “Crawford . . . does not address whether 
a disinterested party to a harassment claim could use 
that claim [of discrimination against the victim] as its 
own basis for a Title VII [retaliation] action.” (App. 13a). 
“ [T]he breadth of Crawford's application to individuals 
who suffered workplace discrimination is not transferrable 
to the entirety of the management string that might 
review any such allegation.” (Id.).
Brush would have us extend Crawford’s 
reasoning not just to those directly impacted by 
workplace discrimination but to all individuals 
involved in the investigation, no matter how far 
distant. Although we have not yet passed on the 
transitive property of a Title VII claim, other 
circuits have by creating what is known as the 
“manager rule.”
(App. lla-12a).
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s manager rule, a manager 
is not protected if, while acting within the scope of her 
employment, she opposes discrimination against another 
employee. Such a manager would be covered by section 
704(a) only insofar as she was opposing discrimination in 
the procedure for handling a discrimination complaint. 
Thus, although Brush could not base a retaliation claim 
on her opposition to sexual harassment of Mrs. Doe, she 
would have been protected for opposing an unlawful 
response to Doe’s complaint—e.g., if Sears had refused 
to investigate the complaint because of Doe’s religion.
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Although she seeks to predicate her claim for 
retaliation upon Mrs. Doe’s claims of sexual 
harassment and rape, Brush was neither 
the aggrieved nor the accused party in the 
underlying allegations. Instead, she was one 
of the Sears employees tasked with conducting 
the internal investigation. As such her claims 
relate not to Mrs. Doe’s allegations, but instead 
to the procedures of the internal investigation 
conducted by Sears.
(App. 10a) (emphasis added). The only viable manager 
retaliation claim is one that “relates to” the manner in 
which a discrimination claim is handled. In this case, 
however, Sears’ handling of Doe’s harassment complaint 
(as opposed to the treatment of Doe herself) was not itself 
unlawful. “Brush . . . has cited no . . . federal law that 
would have mandated Sears take some action other tha[n] 
what it took.. . .  [I]t is impossible for Brush to have had 
a reasonable belief that Sears’ actions [in handling Doe’s 
complaint] were unlawful.” (App. 14a).
(2) Three other circuits have adopted a version of the 
manager rule. The Eighth Circuit endorses the manager 
rule as a limitation on Title VII retaliation claims. EEOC 
v. HBE Corp., 135 F. 3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998). HBE 
held that in a section 704(a) case there is “[a] requirement 
of ‘stepping outside’ a normal role,” e.g. “outside the 
normal managerial role which is to further company 
policy.” That requirement is not met by “merely alert[ing] 
management of potential violations of the law in order to 
avoid liability for the company.” Id. In HBE the company’s 
director of personnel, after being told to dismiss an 
African-American employee, double checked (and found
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groundless) the criticism of that worker, expressed a 
belief that the dismissal decision was racially motivated, 
and ultimately refused to terminate that employee. The 
Eighth Circuit held that the director of personnel was 
protected only because he had refused to fire the worker, 
since that refusal of a direct order “placed him outside 
the normal managerial role which is to further company 
policy.” 135 F. 3d at 554.
The Fifth Circuit adopted a manager rule in Hagan 
v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d 617,627-30 (5th Cir. 
2008). “[W]e agree that an employee must do something 
outside his or her job role” to be protected by an anti­
retaliation provision.” 529 F. 3d at 628.
If we did not require an employee to “step 
outside the role” or otherwise make clear to 
the employer that the employee was taking a 
position adverse to the employer, nearly every 
activity in the normal course of a manager’s 
job would potentially be protected activity___
519 F. 3d at 628. “[OJtherwise . . . whole groups of 
employees—management employees, human resources 
employees, and legal employees, to name a few—[would] 
be[] difficult to discharge . . . ” 529 F. 3d at 628.
The Tenth Circuit originated the manager rule in 
McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F. 3d 1478,1486 (10th Cir. 
1996). McKenzie concluded that an Assistant Personnel 
Director did not engage in protected activity under the 
FLSA when she expressed “concern” to higher officials 
that the company might be in violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. The Tenth Circuit held that bringing
16
such information to the attention of the employer does 
not constitute protected activity, so long as the official 
does not go further and actually object to the practice in 
question or disagree with the employer’s actions.
McKenzie was not asserting any rights under 
the FLSA, but rather was merely performing 
her everyday duties as personnel director . . . .  
McKenzie never crossed the line from being 
an employee merely performing her job as 
personnel director . . . .  [S]he [only] informed 
the company that it was at risk of claims that 
might be instituted by others . . . .  In order to 
engage in protected activity. . . ,  the employee 
must step outside his or her role of representing 
the company. . . .
94 F. 3d at 1486-87.
Although McKenzie and Hagan involved retaliation 
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the manager 
rule is treated as a matter of general federal law, rather 
than a construction of any particular federal statute. 
Thus, McKenzie and Hagan are the authorities on which 
the lower courts have generally relied in applying the 
manager rule in Title VII cases. In the instant case both 
the Eleventh Circuit and the District Court (as well as the 
defendant itself22) relied on McKenzie and Hagan as the 
basis for the manager rule. (App. 12a, 28a).
22. Defendant’s Memorandum of law in Support of Its Motion 
for Summary Final Judgment, p. 9.
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B. The Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits Have 
Rejected The Manager Rule
Two circuits have squarely rejected the manager 
rule, reasoning that this limitation on section 704(a) both 
violates the rights of the officials involved and undermines 
compliance with Title VII.
In Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F. 3d 
561 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt 
the manager rule limitation. The plaintiff in Johnson 
was a Vice President for Human Resources and Human 
Relations, and one of his primary responsibilities was to 
manage the employer’s affirmative action program. He 
was dismissed in retaliation for his advocacy on behalf 
of minorities.
Plaintiff protested discrimination that occurred 
in the hiring process . . . .  [T]he fact that 
Plaintiff may have had a contractual duty 
to voice such concerns is of no consequence 
to his claim. Under Title VII . . . there is no 
qualification on who the individual doing the 
complaining may be . . . .  [T]he district court’s 
conclusion, that as a high-level affirmative 
action official Plaintiff could not claim protected 
advocacy under the opposition clause .. . runs 
counter to the broad approach used when 
considering a claim for retaliation under this 
clause . . . .  [T]he district court allows for an 
employer to retaliate against the person best 
able to oppose the employer’s discriminatory 
practices—the “high-level affirmative action 
official”—without fear of reprisal under Title
18
VII---- [T]he individual who has contracted to
advocate on behalf of women and minorities has 
not thereby contracted to be retaliated against 
for his advocacy.
215 F. 3d at 579-80 (emphasis omitted). One member of the 
Sixth Circuit panel dissented, unsuccessfully urging the 
adoption of the very scope-of-employment based manager 
rule applied by the Eleventh Circuit in the instant case.
The plaintiff contends that he was terminated 
for his active advocacy on behalf of minorities, 
yet, this was his job. If he was not performing 
his job to the satisfaction of his employers, 
the University is entitled to dismiss him.
The plaintiff has presented no evidence that 
his advocacy went beyond the scope of his 
employment, and I believe this is significant.
I do think that the plaintiffs employment as a 
high level affirmative action officer does and 
should make a difference in the analysis of his 
claims. Because it was his job to advocate on 
behalf of minorities I do not think he is entitled 
to protected status for his general advocacy on 
behalf of minorities.
215 F. 3d at 587-88 (Kennedy, J. concurring and dissenting) 
(emphasis added); see Nemeth v. Citizens Financial 
Group, Inc., 2011 WL 2531200 at *6 (E.D.Mich. June 24) 
(rejecting manager rule defense in light of Johnson).
In Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F. 2d 1113 
(D.C.Cir. 1981), the plaintiff was a federal EEO Counselor; 
the district court found that Smith had been retaliated
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against because of his EEO activities. On appeal, one 
member of the appellate court argued that the court 
should adopt a version of the manager rule, and should 
hold that section 704(a) does not protect EEO officials from 
retaliation for conduct that is part of their job assignment.
This provision of the Act was not designed to 
protect those, such as EEO counselors, whose 
own employer . . . has assigned them to work 
on civil rights matters . . . .  Mere participation 
in EEO is insufficient.
659 F. 2d at 1124 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The District 
of Columbia Circuit, however, emphatically rejected that 
proposed limitation on the scope of section 704(a).
[T]he plain language of Title VII prohibits 
reprisals against employees for their 
participation in EEO activities . . . .  Smith’s 
EEO work, performed pursuant to a designation 
by the Department of the Navy, plainly falls 
within the protective ambit of the statutory 
language. It is the explicit function of EEO 
officers to “assist” in “investigation(s)” and 
“proceeding(s)” under Title VII, and it is for 
work of this kind that Smith was penalized.
. . . .  Smith was found to be the victim of an 
“improper consideration of his EEO duties”; 
he was . . . wrongly criticized for performing 
functions given protected status under Title 
VII.
659 F. 2d at 1121-22. The District of Columbia Circuit 
opinion specifically noted that Title VII protects officials
20
who conduct internal investigations—one of the key actions 
in which Brush had engaged—even when conducting such 
investigations is an “explicit function” of the position in 
question.
C. The Circuits That Have Adopted The Manager Rule 
Disagree About When That Rule Applies
The circuits that have adopted the manager rule are 
divided about when it applies. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits 
hold that the rule does not bar protection of a manager— 
even if acting within the scope of his or her employment— 
if he or she assists or advocates for an employee whose 
rights may have been violated, or complains to other 
officials about the manner in which the employer has 
dealt with the asserted violation of that employee’s rights. 
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, 
recognize no such limitation on the manager rule.
In the seminal decision in McKenzie v. Renberg’s, 
Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that the manager rule does 
not apply—and a management official is protected from 
retaliation—if he or she goes beyond merely informing 
the employer of a risk of liability and “actively assist[s] 
other employees in asserting. . .  rights.” 94 F. 3d at 1486. 
A manager’s actions would thus constitute protected 
activity, the Tenth Circuit holds, if the manager assisted 
the employee in some way, such as by engaging in 
“advocacy of rights [of the employee],” being “supportive 
of adverse rights [of that worker],” or “complaining] to 
superiors.” M  (emphasis added). The manager rule did 
apply in McKenzie because the plaintiff there had merely 
expressed “concerns” about whether company practices 
were legal and “informed the company that it was at risk 
of claims that might be instituted by others.” Id.
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The Fifth Circuit recognized the same limitation on the 
manager rule in Hagan v. Echo Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d 
617 (5th Cir. 2008). The supervisor in that case had merely 
passed on to other officials a question that subordinates 
had raised regarding possible entitlement to additional 
overtime pay. The Fifth Circuit held that this action was 
subject to the manager rule because the supervisor had 
no intent to assist the workers in obtaining more money 
and did not in fact believe that they were entitled to the 
additional compensation they sought. 529 F. 3d at 630. 
The plaintiff was simply repeating to his superiors the 
question asked by his subordinates, not “assisting [those] 
employees in asserting rights.” 529 F. 3d at 628 (<quoting 
McKenzie, 94 F. 3d at 1486-87). The plaintiff would have 
been protected from retaliation if he had “complain[ed] to 
his employer on behalf of [the workers],” was acting “as 
an advocate for [the subordinates],” or was “personally 
advocating on behalf of his [subordinate’s] statutory 
rights.” 529 F. 3d at 629-30.
But neither the Eighth Circuit in HBE nor the Eleventh 
Circuit in the instant case recognizes such a limitation on 
the manager rule. The difference between the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuit version of the manager rule, on the one hand, 
and the version in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, is of 
controlling importance in the instant case. The Eleventh 
Circuit correctly recognized that Brush had “acted on 
Doe’s behalf.” (App. 13a). Brush repeatedly complained 
about the manner in which Sears’ was responding to Doe’s 
complaint, pressing for quicker action and for the selection 
of an investigator with criminal investigation expertise. 
When higher officials suggested that Doe might be lying 
to cover up a consensual sexual relationship with the 
Store Coach, Brush spoke up on Doe’s behalf, insisting
22
the sexual relationship could not have been consensual 
because Doe—when being interviewed by Brush—was 
“visibly frightened of this man.”23 In the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuit those actions by Brush would have placed her 
outside the manager rule, and would have constituted 
protected activity. But in the Eleventh Circuit all that 
mattered was that Brush’s actions—regardless of whether 
they involved assistance, advocacy and complaining to 
superiors—were within Brush’s scope of employment.
D. The Ninth Circuit Applies A Rule That Is The 
Opposite of The Plurality Manager Rule
The four circuits applying the manager rule do agree 
that the rule would not apply to an official who stepped 
outside of his or her official role and took some action that 
was adverse to the interests of the employer. (See App. 
13a). Several of those decisions cite as the quintessential 
example of that type of protected activity the filing 
with government officials of a charge that the employer 
had engaged in an unlawful employment action. E.g., 
McKenzie, 94 F. 3d at 1486 (manager protected if she 
“initiate[s] a . . . claim against the company on her own 
behalf or on behalf of anyone else”).
In Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F. 2d 214 (9th Cir. 1981), 
however, the Ninth Circuit applied the opposite rule, 
holding that filing such charges was not protected 
precisely because it was outside the official’s scope of 
employment and adverse to the interests of the employer. 
In Smith the plaintiff, a director of industrial relations, 
filed complaints with EEOC and another federal agency
23. Brush Dep., 92-93.
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alleging widespread discriminatory practices at a 
particular facility. The Ninth Circuit held that Smith 
could be dismissed for that action precisely because it was 
adverse to the interests of the company.
[I]f . . . .  he was fired simply for having filed 
[the complaints], we conclude that firing him 
. . . would have been justified. . . . [Plaintiffs] 
position . . . required the occupant to act 
on behalf of his employer in an area where 
normally action against the employer and on 
behalf of the employees is protected activity.
. . .  If § 2000e-3(a) give [plaintiff] the right to 
make himself an adversary of the company, 
then . . .  he is forever immune from discharge.
. . .  By filing complaints against Singer . ..  . , 
appellant placed himself in a position squarely 
adversary to his company. In doing so he wholly 
disabled himself from continuing to represent 
the company’s interest...  and from continuing 
to work with Singer executives . . . .
650 F.3d at 216-17 (emphasis added); see id. at 216 (section 
704(a) does not protect opposition that is “inconsistent with 
the requirements of the employee’s position.”).
II. THE MANAGER RULE CREATES A MAJOR 
OBSTACLE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE 
VII AND OTHER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT 
STATUTES
The manager rule strikes at the very heart of the 
voluntary compliance mechanisms on which Title VII 
depends and which section 704(a) was enacted to protect.
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In the four circuits which have adopted the manager 
rule as a major restriction on the scope of section 704(a), 
employers today are often permitted to retaliate against 
anti-discrimination efforts by the very personnel and 
other management officials who are in the best position to 
prevent and correct violations of Title VII. District court 
decisions applying the manager rule have repeatedly 
sanctioned reprisals against officials who were attempting 
to assure compliance with Title VII and other important 
federal employment laws. The serious obstacle to 
implementation of federal law that has been created by the 
manager rule poses an important problem that warrants 
review by this Court.
In enacting Title VII and other federal employment 
statutes, Congress did not provide that those laws would be 
enforced by an army of federal agents constantly visiting 
and monitoring every private and public employer in the 
nation. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 
288, 292 (1960). Rather, compliance with these statutes 
rests largely on the voluntary actions of employers, which 
necessarily requires effective internal mechanisms for 
“prevent[ing] and promptly correct[ing]” violations of the 
statute. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742,765 (1998). The efficacy of those internal mechanisms 
turns to a substantial degree on the skill and commitment 
of the officials who administer them.
The internal compliance mechanisms on which Title 
VII depends could not possibly function effectively if 
the management officials responsible for detecting and 
correcting violations of the statute could lawfully be 
retaliated against when—indeed because—they were 
carrying out those very duties. The types of retaliatory
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acts that “well might. . .  ‘dissuade[] a reasonable worker 
from making... a charge of discrimination,’” Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 
(2006), would be equally effective in deterring a reasonable 
official from reporting allegations of discrimination, from 
conducting a thorough investigation of such charges, and 
from reaching conclusions that might be disfavored by 
higher officials. Risk of retaliation that chills the operation 
of an employer’s internal machinery can be an even 
greater threat to voluntary compliance than the danger 
of reprisal that deters a single individual victim.
[EJxtending the [manager] rule [to section 
704(a)] would strip Title VII protection from 
“whole groups of employees—management 
employees, human resources employees, and 
legal employees, to name a few”—employees 
who are in the best position to advise employers 
about compliance.
Rangel v. Omni Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 2010 WL 3927744 
at *5 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 4){quoting Hagan, 529 F. 3d at 528). 
The manager rule has been applied to retaliation claims 
of precisely those individuals who it is most important 
be able to oppose discrimination “without apprehension 
of personal consequences to [themselves,]” Stump 
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978): a Director of 
Personnel24, a Human Resources Director25, a human
24. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F. 3d at 549; McKenzie, 94 F. 
3d at 1481.
25. Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F.Supp. 2d 
60,61 (D.P.R. 2005); Adams v. Northstar Location Services, Inc., 
2010 WL 3911415 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 1).
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resources manager26, an “HR professional”27, a Senior 
Employee Relations Specialist28, and a Director of an 
Office of Diversity.29
The efforts of such officials to oppose violations of 
federal employment laws—like the complaints of the 
victims themselves— can trigger retaliation. In some 
instances that may occur because the individual being 
investigated outranks the personnel official conducting 
the investigation. In Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 
Inc., 380 F.Supp. 2d 60 (D.RR. 2005), relied on by the 
District Court below (App. 28a), a company’s Human 
Resources Director informed the company president 
and vice-president that “in accordance with his duties, 
he was initiating an investigation concerning complaints 
of sexual harassment against them.” 380 F.Supp. 2d at 
61. The plaintiff “was terminated that afternoon.” Id. 
Applying the manager rule, the district court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s section 704(a) claim, holding that the 
plaintiff’s actions were not “protected activities” under 
Title VII because those actions “were part of his job 
responsibilities.” 380 F. Supp. 2d at 62. “Vidal was working 
in his capacity as a Human Resources Director, for the 
benefit of the company, and in accordance with its policies 
forbidding sexual harassment, when he notified [his
26. Cook v. CTC Communications Corp., 2007 WL 3284337 
at *1 (D.N.H. Oct. 30).
27. Bradford v. UPMC, 2008 WL 191706 at *3 (W.D.Pa. Jan.
18).
28. Clemons v. Nike, Inc., 2007 WL 2890972 (D.Or. 2007).
29. Johnson v. County of Nassau, 480 F.Supp. 2d 481, 588 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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superiors] of the claims against them and of his intention 
to start an investigation on the matter.” Id. Personnel 
officials may run a similar risk if the individual alleged 
to have engaged in discrimination is a valuable employee 
whom management would prefer not to fire or embarrass; 
in sexual harassment cases the harasser ordinarily holds 
a higher, more important position than the victim, and is 
using that elevated position to intimidate his victim. See 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-03 
(1998).
Upper management may also object to internal efforts 
to comply with federal employment law because they 
could cost the firm money. In Stein v. Rousseau, 2006 
WL 2263340 (E.D.Wa. Aug. 8), a manager pointed out 
that the employer’s existing overtime-compensation policy 
was unlawful under the FLSA; the firm’s owner agreed 
to change the policy. A disagreement arose about what 
to say to workers about the firm’s earlier policy, which 
ended with one of the owners shouting at the manager, “I 
am not kidding, if they come in here and it costs me tens 
of thousands of dollars, we will take you out behind the 
building and shoot you.” Id. at *1. The manager was fired 
the next day. The district court held that the retaliation 
suit of the dismissed official was barred by the manager 
rule. Id. at *4. Any internal investigation that unearths 
evidence of a Title VII violation also has the potential to 
result in unwanted financial exposure for the employer 
and thus anger higher officials.
The manager rule is not limited in its application to 
personnel officials; it has been applied to any supervisor 
who—as is true of most supervisors—has a duty to 
report problems to higher officials. For example, in
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Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, 2008 WL 
1848796 (M.D. Ala. April 24), the retaliation victim was an 
automobile plant official responsible for purchasing parts. 
Id. at *2. The district court held that he could be dismissed 
for reporting several incidents of sexual harassment 
because the official’s job responsibilities broadly included 
“reporting] alleged unlawful conduct.” Id. at *11.
Plaintiff admits that his job constantly required 
him to bring to the management. . . areas of 
concern in the workplace. . . . Plaintiff . . .  on 
a weekly basis . . . participated in meetings 
convened between [a Deputy President] 
and the directors for the specific purpose of 
addressing “concerns for the benefit of the 
company” and flagging problems that needed 
to be “rectified].”
Id. at *11. In Rice v. Spinx Co., 2012 WL 684019 (D.S.C. 
March 2), the court applied the manager rule to dismiss 
the Title VII claim of a store manager who was retaliated 
against because, when an employee from another store 
told him she had been sexually harassed, that manager 
reported that harassment to higher officials, helped the 
victim fill out the firm’s sexual harassment form, and 
delivered that form to the company’s human resources 
department. 2012 WL 684019 at *l-*5. Although Rice was 
not a personnel official, his assistance for the harassment 
victim was held unprotected because he was “following 
Defendant’s harassment policy” and “acting within the 
scope of his duties.” 2012 WL 684019 at *4 n. 4 and *5 n. 
5. In Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 653 F.Supp. 2d 581 
(E.D.Pa. 2009), the college’s Director of Athletics, in order 
to bring about compliance with Title IX, had
29
repeatedly and consistently advocated for both 
female employees and female students in the 
athletic program. She worked on increasing 
scholarships to female athletes, ensuring 
equitable funding of sports programs, hiring 
full-time coaches for women’s sports, and 
assuring equal pay for female coaching staff.
653 F.Supp. 2d at 596. The college ultimately terminated 
the plaintiff, who filed suit claiming that she had been 
fired in retaliation for her efforts to implement Title IX. 
Applying the manager rule, the district court dismissed 
her claim because her “Title IX activities fail to fall 
within the realm of‘protected activity’ because she never 
engaged in activity that was either adverse to the College 
or outside the scope of her position as Athletic Director.” 
Id.
The manager rule has also been applied to retaliation 
claims by an office manager30, a field service manager31, a 
sales and marketing director32, an Assistant Director of 
Ambulance Services33, a Corporate Security Investigator34,
30. Mousavi v. Parkside Obstetrics, Gynecology & Infertility, 
S.C., 2001 WL 3610080 at *1 (N.D.I11., Aug. 26).
31. Hagan, 529 F. 3d at 620.
32. Stewart v. Master Builders Association of King and 
Snohomish Counties, 736 F.Supp. 1291,1293 (W.D.Wa. 2010).
33. George v. Board ofCnty. Comm’rs of Franklin County, 
Kan., 2007 WL 950270 at *1 (D.Kan. March 26).
34. Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, 2011 WL 4348298 
(M.D.Tenn. Sept. 16).
30
a safety official35 and the chairman of a college Department 
of Economics and Finance.36
These cases illustrate the importance of removing 
the manager rule as a deterrent to vigorous efforts by 
individual officials to bring about compliance with Title 
VII and other important federal employment laws.
III. THE MANAGER RULE IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 704(a)
The manager rule is inconsistent with the plain 
language of section 704(a). The core principle of the 
manager rule limitation is that the protections of section 
704(a) do not apply to every employee who opposes sexual 
harassment or other forms of discrimination. The Eleventh 
Circuit emphatically insisted that section 704(a) does not 
protect “all individuals involved” in internal efforts to 
detect or correct discrimination (App. 11a). Rather, the 
Court of Appeals reasoned, the protections created by 
section 704(a) exist primarily for the discrimination victim 
herself, and thus are “not transferable to the entirety 
o f . . . management.” (App. 13a). The manager rule is a 
“prohibition against certain individuals” invoking the 
protections of section 704(a). (Id.).
Any such restriction on which employees are protected 
by section 704(a) is incompatible with the terms of the 
statute, which forbid an employer “to discriminate against 
any of his employees . . . .  because he has opposed any
35. Hill v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2997556 at *1.
36. Ezuma v. City University of New York, 665 F.Supp. 116, 
118 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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practice, made an unlawful practice by this subchapter 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). The adjective 
“any” precludes construing the statute, as have the 
Eleventh Circuit and other lower courts, to forbid 
retaliation only against some employees who oppose 
unlawful discrimination, and to actually permit retaliation 
against “certain” types of employees. The use of “any” is 
inconsistent with reading into section 704(a) a limitation 
that places a group of employees outside the protection 
of the provision. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an 
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately 
of whatever kind!” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997)(quoting Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 97 (1976))(emphasis added). “[T]he normal 
meaning of the term ‘any’ [allows of] no limitation.” 
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974). ‘“[A]ny . . .’ 
suggest a broad interpretation.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325,1332 (2011).
When Congress wanted to exclude some category 
of individuals from the protections of Title VII, it did so 
expressly. For example, section 701(f) defines “employee” 
to exclude elected officials and certain of their appointees. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Section 702(a) provides that Title 
VII does not apply to the employment of an alien outside 
the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a). Section 703(f) 
provides that the prohibitions in Title VII (including 
section 704(a)) do not include action taken by an employer 
“with respect to an individual who is a member of the 
communist Party” or certain related organizations. 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(g) (individuals who cannot 
fulfill applicable national security based requirement 
not protected from certain adverse actions), 2000e-2(k) 
(3) (disparate impact provision does not apply to certain
32
users of controlled substances). This Court has repeatedly 
refused to read into one provision of a statute a type of 
exception that Congress expressly imposed only in other 
provisions. Astrue v. Capato exrel. B.N.C., 132 S.Ct. 2021, 
2029 (2012); Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
This Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), made clear that 
the protections of section 704(a) are not limited to the 
victims of unlawful discrimination. Section 704(a), the 
Court explained, forbids retaliatory acts that “well might 
have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from... supporting a 
charge of discrimination,”’ 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting Rochon 
v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211,1219 (D.C.Cir. 2006))(emphasis 
added) or “are likely to dissuade employees from . . . 
assisting in complaints about discrimination.” 548 U.S. 
at 70 (emphasis added). Manifestly a personnel official or 
other manager could “support[]” a discrimination charge 
or “assist” the victim of sexual harassment. Burlington 
Northern’s, interpretation of section 704(a) clearly 
encompasses the instant case, which the Eleventh Circuit 
correctly described as involving “actions that Brush took 
on Mrs. Doe’s behalf.” (App. 13a).
In Crawford this Court held that under section 704(a) 
a sexual harassment victim could not be fired because, 
in response to questions by “a Metro human resources 
officer,” the victim “described several instances of sexually 
harassing behavior.” 555 U.S. at 274. Under the manager 
rule applied by the Eleventh Circuit, however, the very 
human resources officer in Crawford, who was attempting 
to prevent or correct violations of Title VII by “looking 
into rumors of sexual harassment,” could have been fired
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for asking those questions, for reporting Ms. Crawford’s 
answers to other officials, or for indicating that she 
believed Crawford’s statements. Section 704(a) cannot 
function as intended, protecting efforts to end violations 
of Title VII, if only one party to such an investigatory 
interview is protected from retaliation.
The decision below—and the manager rule—rest on 
the mistaken assumption that conduct which is within the 
scope of employment of a manager cannot also be opposition 
to unlawful discrimination. But carrying out one’s official 
duties and opposing violations of the law are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, the employees of the EEOC and 
of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice 
in their daily work are both opposing discrimination and 
acting within the scope of their employment. So were 
the attorneys from the Office of the Solicitor General 
who represented the United States before this Court in 
cases such as Crawford, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 
S.Ct. 1186 (2011), and Thompson v. North American 
Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011). The fact that Brush 
was acting within the scope of her employment when she 
reported Doe’s allegations of sexual harassment, insisted 
on re-interviewing Doe to find out the true nature of that 
harassment, pressed her superiors for a speedier and 
more aggressive response, and defended the veracity of 
Doe’s claims is simply irrelevant to whether those actions 
constituted opposition protected by section 704(a).
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of, certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Appendix A  
FAY, Circuit Judge:
Long considered a formidable weapon against an 
employer’s unlawful practices in the workplace, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) 
et seq., has historically been used by plaintiffs to recover 
for discrimination on such bases as race, color, sex or 
national origin.1 None of those recognized bases for 
recovery are implicated here. At issue instead is an 
employee’s termination following a company’s internal 
investigation into an allegation of workplace sexual 
harassment.2 The plaintiff here, though, was neither the 
employee that complained of the sexual harassment nor 
the employee allegedly responsible for that harassment. 
Rather, Plaintiff-Appellant Janet Brush (“Brush”) was 
one of the employees tasked with conducting the internal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) 
(“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress 
to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate 
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered 
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of 
minority citizens.” ) (internal citations omitted); M eritor  
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66,106 S.Ct. 2399,91 L.Ed.2d 
49 (1986) (recognizing discrimination based on sex is actionable 
under Title VII).
2. The Complaint at issue here alleges causes of action under 
both Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), 
Fla. Stat. § 760.10 et seq. However, we need not distinguish between 
the two, since Plaintiff-Appellant concedes that both causes of 
action are interpreted under similar standards. See also Harper 
v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385,1389 (11th Cir.1998).
3a
investigation. Defendant-Appellee Sears Holding 
Corporation (“Sears”) terminated her soon after.3 Brush 
subsequently filed suit against Sears, alleging she was 
terminated in retaliation for certain actions she took as 
an investigator of the sexual harassment claim.
Upon consideration of Sears’ motion for summary 
judgment, the district court found Brush could not support 
a Title VII retaliation claim. Among the deficiencies the 
district court identified in Brush’s claim was the fact that 
she was not engaged in “protected activity” as defined by 
Title VII and therefore her subsequent termination could 
not be actionable as retaliation. We affirm.
I.
“This court reviews a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal 
standards used by the district court.” Galvez v. Bruce, 
552 F.3d 1238,1241 (11th Cir.2008). Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Swisher Int’l., 
Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir.2008). “In 
making this determination, we ... draw[ ] all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 
F.3d 1354,1358 (11th Cir.1999). Of course, the nonmoving
3. Brush was employed by Kmart, which is a subsidiary of 
Sears Holding Corporation. However, for the sake of clarity with 




party must go beyond the pleadings to present affirmative 
evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242,252,106 S.Ct. 2505,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, 
a plaintiffs failure to support an essential element of her 
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and 
requires the district court to grant summary judgment 
for the defendant. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 
322-23,106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
II.
Janet Brush worked for Sears or its affiliates, off and 
on, for over fifteen years. In her most recent stint, Brush 
was employed from approximately 2000 to November 20,
2007. Beginning in 2006, Brush accepted a position as a 
Loss Prevention District Coach. The district she oversaw 
contained 20 stores. Her job was to minimize varieties of 
risk to the company, including losses arising from theft, 
as well as to protect Sears’ assets, including its employees. 
In that capacity, she interacted with numerous Sears 
employees during the course of her employment. Her 
immediate boss was David Pearson, who served as Sears’ 
Regional Loss Prevention Coach.
During Brush’s employment with Sears, Sears 
had noted several deficiencies relating to Brush’s work 
performance. These deficiencies first became apparent 
at the end of 2006. Early the next year, Sears placed 
Brush on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) to 
address these deficiencies. Although Brush’s PIP plan 
was extended several months to enable her to meet the
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relevant criteria, by all accounts Brush completed her PIP 
on or around September 20, 2007.
Only a few days before her completion of the PIP 
plan, on or around September 15, 2007, Brush received 
a telephone call from an Assistant Store Coach. The 
Assistant Store Coach, whom we refer to simply as 
“Mrs. Doe,” informed Brush that she was being sexually 
harassed by her Store Coach. Brush notified Sears 
of the allegation. Sears suspended the Store Coach 
accused of harassment and directed Brush and another 
Sears employee, Scott Reuter, to meet with Mrs. Doe 
to investigate further. They did so, but both Brush and 
Reuter felt that she was not entirely forthcoming during 
their interview. Reuter and Brush then determined that 
Brush should meet with Mrs. Doe alone “to see if she 
wanted to add anything to her prior interview.” Compl. 
11 40. Brush did so, at which time Mrs. Doe informed her 
that she had been raped multiple times by the Store Coach. 
However, Mrs. Doe asked that neither her husband nor the 
police be informed of the rape. Brush notified Reuter of 
what Mrs. Doe told her, and they subsequently reported 
the same to Sears. Brush “stated that [Sears] need [ed] 
to contact the Orange County Police.” Compl. H 48. Sears 
declined, citing the investigation’s incomplete status and 
Mrs. Doe’s own desire not to involve law enforcement. 
Sears, however, terminated the employment of the Store 
Coach, the man who Mrs. Doe said harassed and raped 
her. Brush nonetheless continued to urge the reporting 
of the alleged rape.
On November 20, 2007, Sears terminated Brush’s 




to the investigation of sexual harassment claims.4 One 
week later, Brush filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging 
sex discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued a 
finding that there was reasonable cause to support Brush’s 
retaliation claim.
Nearly two years later, Brush filed suit against Sears, 
alleging that she was dismissed in retaliation for “her 
opposition to the nature and performance of the [sexual 
harassment] investigation.” Compl. H 5. Specifically, her 
Complaint alleges that she was terminated because “she 
uncovered that [Sears] had negligently allowed three 
forcible rapes to occur on its premises and did nothing 
about it,” Compl. H 59; because “she raised rape issues that 
would have been kept hidden if she had allowed Mr. Reuter 
to conduct the interviews,” Compl. 11 60; “because of her 
participation in the investigation and her opposition to 
the way [Sears] was conducting the investigation,” Compl. 
H 61; and because “she was considered a trouble-maker 
and whistleblower,” Compl. 11 62.
Through discovery, Brush produced evidence 
that showed she “opposed the alleged sexual battery 
[experienced by Mrs. Doe], explained [to her employer, 
Sears] that the seriousness of these allegations required 
police intervention, and that she wanted to call the 
Orange County Police.” Appellant Br. at 8. Furthermore,
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4. Specifically, Sears alleges Brush violated the sexual 
harassment policy in meeting with the complainant alone, in sug­
gesting to the employee that she had been raped without asking an 
open-ended question to see what the employee said, and in failing 
to properly investigate the claim by obtaining video evidence.
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deposition testimony demonstrated that Brush was “very 
adamant... that the authorities should be involved because 
Sears was not capable of investigating this type of criminal 
activity.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Finally, Brush also provided some circumstantial evidence 
that her termination may have been related to her 
involvement in the internal investigation conducted by 
Sears. In particular, she cited a declaration by her former 
boss, Pearson, who stated that he “believe[d] Ms. Brush 
was terminated because of her involvement in uncovering 
and opposing rapes that took place on [Sears’] property.” 
Id. at 11.
Nonetheless, subsequently Sears moved for summary 
judgment, contending that Brush could not establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation and that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact showing that Sears’ decision 
to terminate Brush was pretextual. The district court 
agreed. Brush now appeals.
III.
Title V II’s anti-retaliation provision makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice ..., or because [s]he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 
1370,1375 (11th Cir.2008) (alterations in original) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). As noted by the Supreme Court 
in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
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& Davidson County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274,129 S.Ct. 
846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009), the two clauses of the anti­
retaliation provision are known as the “participation 
clause” and the “opposition clause.” Although Brush’s 
allegations encompassed both means of retaliation, she 
conceded before the district court that she may only 
recover under the opposition clause in this instance. See 
EEOC v. Total Sys. Svcs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th 
Cir.2000) (prohibiting recovery under participation clause 
where no EEOC complaint was filed prior to termination).5 
Therefore, we need only address her claim insomuch as 
it pertains to Brush’s opposition to an allegedly unlawful 
employment practice by Sears. See also Little v. United 
Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 
(11th Cir.1997) (noting also that plaintiff must have an 
objectively reasonable belief that the employer engaged 
in an unlawful employment practice).
Brush’s case rests upon her belief that her opposition 
to rape and Sears’ handling of Mrs. Doe’s allegations are 
actionable under Title VII. Under the framework provided
5. Nonetheless, Brush urges on appeal that Total Sys. is no 
longer good law because of such subsequent decisions as Thompson
v. North American Stainless, LP ,-----U.S.------- , 131 S.Ct. 863,178
L.Ed.2d 694 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp.,-----U.S.------- , 131 S.Ct. 1325,179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011); and
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson 
County, Tennessee, 555 U.S. 271,129 S.Ct. 846,172 L.Ed.2d 650 
(2009). We need not address that argument at this time because, 
“ [u]nder the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by earlier 
panel holdings ... unless and until they are overruled en banc or 




by McDonnell Douglas Corp.,6 Brush must “carry the 
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima 
facie case.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802,93 
S.Ct. 1817. We need only turn to the remaining stages of 
the burden-shifting inquiry under McDonnell Douglas— 
articulation of “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason” by the defendant for the employment action, id. at 
802,93 S.Ct. 1817, and showing of pretext by the plaintiff 
regarding defendant’s stated reasons for the employment 
action, id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817—if a prima facie case is 
established.
To make a prima facie showing of a retaliation claim, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in 
statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially 
adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal 
link between the protected activity and the subsequent 
materially adverse employment action. Butler v. Ala. 
Dep’t ofTransp., 536 F.3d 1209,1212 (11th Cir.2008). It is 
the first prong, protected activity, which we now address.
Quite simply, Brush’s disagreement with the way 
in which Sears conducted its internal investigation into
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6. While Brush disputes the applicability of McDonnell 
Douglas under these circumstances, claiming that Pearson’s 
declaration provides direct evidence of retaliation by Sears, we 
cannot agree. Pearson’s declaration merely states his belief that 
Brush’s termination was in retaliation for Brush’s opposition of 
rape; nowhere does the declaration or any other evidence provided 
by Brush detail specific conversations, communications or other 
direct evidence of retaliatory intent on the part of Sears. Ac­
cordingly, Brush can only prove her case through circumstantial 
evidence, which necessitates the McDonnell Douglas framework.
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Mrs. Doe’s allegations does not constitute protected 
activity. As required by the explicit language of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a), to qualify as “protected activity,” a plaintiffs 
opposition must be to a “practice made unlawful by [Title 
VII.]” Since there is no evidence of Brush’s opposition 
to any unlawful practice here, it follows that Brush can 
support no claim under Title VII.
Although she seeks to predicate her claim for 
retaliation upon Mrs. Doe’s claims of sexual harassment 
and rape, Brush was neither the aggrieved nor the accused 
party in the underlying allegations. Instead, she was 
one of the Sears employees tasked with conducting the 
internal investigation. As such, her claims relate not to 
Mrs. Doe’s allegations, but instead to the procedures of the 
internal investigation conducted by Sears. Although we 
have found no published Eleventh Circuit cases regarding 
whether such a basis is a viable foundation for a Title 
VII retaliation claim, cf. Entrekin v. City of Panama 
City, Fla., 376 Fed.Appx. 987, 994 (11th Cir.2010) (per 
curiam) (unpublished case disallowing recovery under 
similar circumstances), certainly internal investigations 
alone do not constitute discriminatory practices. See,
e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d
1287,1304 (11th Cir.2007) (detailing type of investigative 
procedures acceptable under Title VII). Nor do federal 
courts mandate the procedures that are required under 
such circumstances. See Adams v. O’Reilly Automotive, 
Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir.2008) (“Federal courts, 
however, are not in the business of micromanaging or 
second-guessing companies’ internal investigations.”); 
see also Entrekin, 376 Fed.Appx. at 994 (“Title VII does
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not... establish requirements for an employer’s internal 
procedures for receiving sexual harassment complaints, 
or even require that employers must have an internal 
procedure for receiving such complaints.”).
Nonetheless, Brush argues that an investigative 
manager’s role in reporting a Title VII violation 
necessarily qualifies as a “protected activity” relating 
to a discriminatory practice. Reply Br. at 5 (“[W]hen 
an employee communicates a belief that her employer 
has engaged in employment discrimination, that 
communication virtually always constitutes protected 
activity.”). In support, Brush cites Crawford. In Crawford, 
the Supreme Court held that an employee that responded 
to an inquiry about whether she had ever witnessed 
“inappropriate behavior” from a specific employee was 
protected by Title VII. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 280, 129 
S.Ct. 846. In so finding, the Court rejected the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning that the opposition clause of Title 
VII “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to 
warrant... protection against retaliation.” Id. at 275,129 
S.Ct. 846 (citing Crawford v. Metropolitan Government 
of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed.Appx. 
373, 373 (6th Cir.2006)). Instead, the Court stated that 
the Crawford plaintiff’s opposition was no less actionable 
because she had been asked about sexual harassment 
rather than having volunteered similar allegations. 
Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78,129 S.Ct. 846.
Brush would have us extend Crawford’s reasoning not 
just to those directly impacted by workplace discrimination 
but to all individuals involved in the investigation of that
Appendix A
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discrimination, no matter how far distant. Although we 
have not yet passed on the transitive property of a Title 
VII claim, other circuits have by creating what is known 
as the “manager rule.” In essence, the “manager rule” 
holds that a management employee that, in the course of 
her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes 
the actions of an employer does not engage in “protected 
activity.” See McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 
(10th Cir.1996); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 
F.3d 617 (5th Cir.2008) (same). Instead, to qualify as 
“protected activity” an employee must cross the line from 
being an employee “performing her job ... to an employee 
lodging a personal complaint.” McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486. 
While Brush argues that Crawford has foreclosed the 
“manager rule,” 7 we cannot agree. Crawford pertained 
only to whether the reporting of a harassment claim was
Appendix A
7. Indeed, Brush cites several district court cases she claims 
support this position: Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of America, 
663 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y.2009), and Rangel v. Omni Hotel 
Management Corp., No. SA-09-CV-0811 OG, 2010 WL 3927744 
(W.D.Tex. Oct. 4,2010). However, it should go without saying that 
we are not bound by the decisions of other circuits, let alone the 
decisions of district courts from other circuits. See, e.g., United 
States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218,1266 n. 66 (11th Cir.2012) (“ It 
is axiomatic that this Circuit is bound only by its own precedents 
and those of the Supreme Court... and certainly this is even more 
true in the context of a district court determination from another 
circuit.”) (citing Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,1209 
(11th Cir.1981)). This is even more obvious when considering 
an opinion like Rangel, which is actually a magistrate judge’s 
Report and Recommendation. See Rangel, 2010 WL 3927744, *1. 
Nonetheless, both Rangel and Schanfield are easily distinguishable 
from the facts at issue here.
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covered by Title VII where the reporting was solicited 
rather than volunteered. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78, 
129 S.Ct. 846. It did not address whether a disinterested 
party to a harassment claim could use that harassment 
claim as its own basis for a Title VII action. Accordingly, 
we find the “manager rule” persuasive and a viable 
prohibition against certain individuals recovering under 
Title VII.
Considering the facts adduced by the parties in 
light of the “manager rule,” there can be no dispute that 
Brush acted solely as a manager here. In her capacity 
as an investigator of Mrs. Doe’s sexual harassment 
claim, Brush informed Sears of Mrs. Doe’s allegations, 
investigated those allegations, and reported the results 
of her investigation to Sears. Brush’s job responsibilities 
involved exactly the type of actions that Brush took 
on Mrs. Doe’s behalf. There is simply no evidence in 
the record that Brush was asserting any rights under 
Title VII or that she took any action adverse to the 
company during the investigation. Cf. id. at 1486-87, 
129 S.Ct. 846. Disagreement with internal procedures 
does not equate with “protected activity” opposing 
discriminatory practices. Under such circumstances, 
the breadth of Crawford’s application to individuals who 
suffered workplace discrimination is not transferable to 
the entirety of the management string that might review 
any such allegation.8
8. Of course, we do not foreclose the ability of one employee 
to “oppose” discrimination on another employee’s behalf. Cf. 
Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d 
Cir.1990) (recognizing right of third party to recover for 
retaliation under such a basis). However, where, as here, a third
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The evidence in this record shows that Brush’s 
opposition was to Sears’ failure to immediately summon 
law enforcement and a more general “opposition] to the 
grave forcible sex [alleged by Mrs. Doe].” Brush, however, 
has not demonstrated how these actions were criminally 
unlawful on the part of Sears. She has cited no state or 
federal law that would have mandated Sears take some 
action other that what it took. Sears fired the accused 
offender. Nor has Brush demonstrated that Mrs. Doe in 
this instance wanted her claims reported to the police. 
In fact, it is undisputed that Mrs. Doe informed Brush 
and Sears that she did not want either the police or her 
husband informed of what happened to her. Under these 
circumstances, then, it is impossible for Brush to have had 
a reasonable belief that Sears’ actions were unlawful. Cf. 
Little, 103 F.3d 956 at 960. Therefore, Brush’s deposition 
testimony that she was “opposed [to] the way that Sears 
Holding took care of our associates, took care of the 
investigation” simply refutes any claim that she was 
engaged in protected activity.
As a final matter, to the extent that Brush predicates 
her argument of unlawful employment practices upon 
the alleged rapes by the Store Coach, her argument 
necessarily fails. She conceded both before the district 
court and at oral argument that Sears is not tolerant 
of rape and, in fact, did not tolerate it in this instance. 
Nonetheless, she seeks to found her opposition upon her 
principled stance against rape generally, and rape in
party is neither directly interested in the underlying discrimination 
nor acting beyond the scope of her employment in opposing an 
employer’s action, no Title VII claim will lie.
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the workplace particularly. However, opposition against 
a general type of criminal behavior does not, without 
some connection to the employer, constitute the type of 
opposition to an unlawful employment practice that was 
contemplated by Congress in passing Title VII.
Therefore, we echo the words of Entrekin: “because 
[Brush’s] complaint involved the adequacy of [Sears’] 
internal procedure for receiving sexual harassment 
complaints, rather than an employment practice that Title 
VII declares to be unlawful,” Entrekin, 376 Fed.Appx. at 
994, her criticisms do not relate to unlawful activity. And, 
since unlawful activity is the sine qua non of “protected 
activity” as defined by Title VII, Brush cannot satisfy the 
first requirement of a prima facie case for retaliation.9
Given our holding that Brush cannot satisfy the first 
factor of the three-part prima facie case for retaliation, 
we need not address the district court’s other bases for 
granting summary judgment to Sears. In particular, we 
decline to address the evidence of Brush’s PIP; Sears’ 
proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for Brush’s 
termination; or Brush’s subsequent argument of pretext 
under the burden-shifting inquiry under McDonnell 
Douglas.
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9. Brush urges us that the EEOC letter of determination 
should have some evidentiary weight. While we agree that an EEOC 
reasonable cause finding may be admissible as evidence, Goldsmith 
v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,1288 (11th Cir.2008), it alone 
does not create a genuine dispute of material fact preventing the 




Having studied the record along with the parties’ 
briefs, and entertained oral argument, we find that 
Brush did not engage in statutorily protected activity 
and therefore cannot support a claim for retaliation under 
Title VII. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order 
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Sears Holdings Corporation 
d/b/a Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court pursuant 
to Defendant Sears Holdings Corporation d/b/a Sears, 
Roebuck & Co.’s (“Defendant” or “Kmart”1) motion for 
summary judgment, filed October 1,2010 [DE 33]. Plaintiff 
Janet Brush (“Plaintiff”) responded on October 21, 2010 
[DE 39]. Kmart replied on November 8, 2010 [DE 45]. 
This cause is also before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s
1. K mart is a subsidiary of Sears Holdings Corporation.
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motion to strike, filed October 22, 2010 [DE 40]. Kmart 
responded on November 8,2010 [DE 46]. Plaintiff replied 
on November 18,2010 [DE 48]. The Court held a hearing 
on these motions on December 8,2010. This motion is ripe 
for adjudication.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Information Regarding P laintiff’s 
Employment
Plaintiff worked at Kmart as a Loss Prevention 
District Coach (“LPDC”).2 Plaintiff was responsible for 
minimizing risk to the company. Among other duties, 
Plaintiff was responsible for controlling shrink (e.g., 
external and internal theft) and protecting Kmart’s assets 
(e.g., people, facilities, and merchandise). Between the 
years 2000 and 2006, Plaintiff was responsible for loss 
prevention in approximately 10 stores in Florida. Plaintiff 
aspired to become a Regional Loss Prevention Manager. 
Toward that end, in 2006, Plaintiff accepted a position 
as the LPDC over a 20-store district, which she held 
until her employment was terminated. Plaintiff reported 
to Regional Loss Prevention Coach (“RLPC”), David 
Pearson (“Pearson”), who, in turn, reported to Regional 
Loss Prevention Director, Robert Church (“Church”).
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2. Plaintiff maintains she worked for K mart since 1992 
and began working as a LP D C in 20 00. K mart maintains that 
Plaintiff began working for K mart in 2000. This factual dispute 
is immaterial; Plaintiff worked as an LPD C during the relevant 
time period.
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In 2006, Plaintiff had a number of performance 
deficiencies which were documented in her year-end 
performance review. Plaintiffs performance deficiencies 
included poor shrink results for her district, poor 
inventory preparation, poor market control, poor staffing, 
poor follow- up and poor time management. In early 2007, 
Plaintiff was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan 
(PIP) because of these deficiencies. Plaintiffs PIP was 
extended to 120 days to ensure that she was meeting all 
of the criteria for her position. Plaintiff completed her PIP 
on approximately September 20, 2007.
Plaintiff failed to sustain sufficient performance 
improvement, and her supervisors determined that her 
termination was warranted. In early November 2007, 
Pearson sent a memorandum to Church and Shelly Arnold 
(“Arnold”), the Human Resources Manager for Kmart 
Loss Prevention, in which he outlined Plaintiff’s ongoing 
performance deficiencies and recommended termination. 
On November 10, 2007, Pearson submitted his revised 
memorandum to Arnold for review. The performance 
issues identified by Pearson included: 1) unacceptable 
levels of shrink in Plaintiff’s district; 2) sloppy and 
unprofessional handling and follow up on the placement 
of a loss prevention employee whose background check 
included disqualifying information, which was met with 
sharp criticism from the company’s Human Resources 
Compliance Team; 3) failure to perform adequate store 
visits; 4) failure to train store Loss Prevention Coaches 
(LPCs) and ensure timely completion of corporate 
initiatives; 5) poor communication with her supervisor;
6) failure to timely complete a children’s toy recall; and
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7) Plaintiff’s poor judgment and failure to follow-up 
regarding an internal sexual harassment investigation. 
Kmart determined that Plaintiff’s ongoing performance 
problems and the unwanted risks associated with them 
warranted termination. Plaintiff’s employment was 
terminated on November 20,2007.
Plaintiff claims she was terminated in retaliation for 
her participation in the sexual harassment investigation 
and for her opposition to alleged violations of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e, et seq. and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), 
Fla. Stat. § 760.01, et seq.
B. The Sexual Harassment Investigation
Kmart evidently has its loss prevention department 
play a role in internal sexual harassment investigations. 
On September 15,2007, Plaintiff received a call on her cell 
phone from an assistant store manager (“complainant”) 
who alleged that she had been sexually harassed by her 
store manager. The complainant stated that the manager 
had been sending inappropriate text messages to her cell 
phone. The complainant also disclosed to Plaintiff that 
complainant’s husband found her cell phone and saw the 
text messages from the manager. The complainant made 
no mention of any sexual encounter with the manager, 
consensual or otherwise.
Plaintiff communicated the complaint to Regional 
Manager Dave Rodney (“Rodney”) and to Pearson. Keith 
Johnson (“Johnson”), the Divisional Loss Prevention
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Director, emailed to Plaintiff and District Coach Scott 
Reuter (“Reuter”), Plaintiffs operations counterpart, 
the company’s sexual harassment investigation packet, 
which contained forms and instructions on howto conduct 
investigations.
On September 16, 2007, Plaintiff and Reuter were 
instructed to travel to the store at issue and to suspend 
the alleged harasser. Plaintiff and Reuter were next 
instructed to meet with the complainant’s husband. 
During that meeting, Plaintiff did not inquire as to the 
circumstances under which he either came upon the 
text messages or possessed his wife’s cell phone. After 
meeting the complainant’s husband, Church and Johnson 
instructed Plaintiff and Reuter to return to the store and 
further investigate the allegations. Reuter interviewed 
witnesses from the forms provided in the investigative 
packet. Plaintiff acted as note-taker during the interviews.
Reuter and Plaintiff interviewed the complainant first. 
Plaintiff later interviewed the complainant in private, 
after which she informed Church that the complainant had 
been raped and that law enforcement should be contacted.3 
Plaintiff made that recommendation without having 
reviewed the store’s surveillance video, having spoken 
with the manager or other fact witnesses, or having
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3. Exactly what occurred during this interview is in dispute. 
Plaintiff maintains that the complainant volunteered that she had 
been raped. K mart maintains that Plaintiff suggested to the 
complainant that the complainant had been raped. What did or 
did not occur during this interview was not the exclusive basis for 
the decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment, however
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made any effort to obtain details from the complainant 
regarding the alleged rapes or otherwise test the veracity 
of those new allegations. Church asked Plaintiff to refrain 
from contacting the police until he sought guidance from 
the company’s legal department.
Plaintiff was instructed to obtain copies of relevant 
surveillance footage from the store. Plaintiff delegated 
this task to Lisa Murphy, the store’s LPC, who was not 
only the store manager’s subordinate but also a fact 
witness in the investigation. Additionally, Plaintiff failed 
to ensure that the video was properly annotated and never 
reviewed the footage before it was sent to the corporate 
office for analysis.
The store manager eventually admitted to a consensual 
affair with complainant. His employment was terminated, 
and the complainant was transferred to another store.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires entry of 
summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment should be 
granted when the record, taken as a whole, could not lead 
a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. 
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986). The non-moving party must go 
beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence 
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
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trial. Id. at 252,106 S.Ct. at 2512. It is not sufficient for the 
non-moving party to show a mere “scintilla” of evidence, 
or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly 
probative, in support of its position. Id. Additionally, 
conclusory allegations and conjecture are not sufficient to 
overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Mayfield v. 
Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371,1376 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the three-part 
allocation of proof established by the Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802-04, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25 (1973). If Plaintiff can establish a 
prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts 
to Kmart to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 
for the challenged employment actions. See Hanley v. 
Sports Auth., 143 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
If Kmart does so, Plaintiff must show that Kmart’s 
proffered reasons are a mere pretext for discrimination by 
pointing to concrete evidence in the form of specific facts 
discrediting Kmart’s proffered reason for the challenged 
employment action. See Mayfield, 101 F.3d at 1376.
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under 
Title VII and the FCRA, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) 
she engaged in “protected activity”; (2) she suffered 
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action. Brown v. Snow, 440 F. 3d 1259,1266 
(11th Cir. 2006); Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment 
Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998)(“decisions 







Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate against any of 
his employees . ..  because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Statutorily protected activity 
is limited to where an employee: a) has made a charge, 
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, commonly known as the “participation 
clause”; or b) has opposed any practice made unlawful by 
Title VII, commonly known as the “opposition clause.” Id.
Plaintiff originally attempted to invoke protection 
under both the participation and the opposition clauses. 
Plaintiff alleges that her “participation” in the internal 
investigation affords her protection under Title VII’s 
“participation clause.” Plaintiff also invokes protection 
under the “opposition clause” by claiming that she 
“opposed” the manner in which Kmart conducted its 
internal investigation. More specifically, Plaintiff claims 
that her termination was motivated by her disagreement 
with Kmart’s decision not to immediately summon
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local law enforcement to independently investigate 
the allegations. Plaintiff’s claims, even if true, do not 
constitute statutorily-protected activity under either 
clause of the anti-retaliation statutes.
Plaintiff concedes in her response that she cannot 
rely on the participation clause. The participation clause 
applies only to “proceedings and activities which occur 
in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge 
with the EEOC; [and] does not include participating in 
an employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted 
apart from a formal charge with the EEOC.” EEOC v. 
Total Syst. Svcs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,1174 (11th Cir. 2000), 
reh’g en banc denied 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). As 
Plaintiff’s participation was in connection with Kmart’s 
internal investigation, the participation clause does not 
apply.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with Kmart’s decision not 
to immediately summon local law enforcement does not 
constitute protected activity under the opposition clause. 
To constitute protected activity under this clause, the 
conduct being opposed must be a “practice made unlawful 
by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Fla. Stat. 
§ 760.10(7) (“it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer... to discriminate against any person because 
that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful 
employment practice under this section”). While a plaintiff 
need not prove that the employer’s conduct was actually 
unlawful, the allegations and record must also indicate 
that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively 
reasonable. Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold
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Div., 103 F. 3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
a plaintiff must show both a subjective belief that the 
employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice 
and that the belief was objectively reasonable). Whether 
the belief is objectively reasonable is measured against 
existing substantive law. Clark County School District 
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269, 271,121 S.Ct. 1508, 1509- 
10 (2001) (holding that exposure to one sexist remark is 
insufficient to constitute sexual harassment).
Plaintiff cannot establish that she engaged in activity 
protected by the opposition clause. Kmart’s decision to 
conduct additional investigation and to consult with its legal 
department before acting on Plaintiffs recommendation to 
call law enforcement is not an employment practice “made 
unlawful” under either Title VII or the FCRA. These 
statutes do not dictate how an employer must conduct 
internal investigations of discrimination claims. “Title 
VII does not...establish requirements for an employer’s 
internal procedures for receiving sexual harassment 
complaints, or even require that employers must have 
an internal procedure for receiving such complaints.” 
Entrekin v. City of Panama City, 376 Fed.Appx. 987,994 
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in 
protected activity because plaintiff’s complaint involved 
adequacy of defendant’s internal procedure for receiving 
sexual harassment complaints, rather than an employment 
practice that Title VII declares to be unlawful). See also 
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d
1287,1304 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that a company need not 
“conduct a full-blown due process, trial-type proceeding 
in response to complaints of sexual harassment. All that is 
required of an investigation is reasonableness in all of the
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circumstances, and the permissible circumstances may 
include conducting the inquiry informally in a manner that 
will not unnecessarily disrupt the company’s business, 
and in an effort to arrive at a reasonably fair estimate of 
truth”).
Not only was there no legal requirement for Kmart to 
contact law enforcement under the facts of this case, but 
the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it would have 
been inappropriate to do so. The complainant specifically 
told Plaintiff that she did not want law enforcement 
or her husband involved in the matter. When Plaintiff 
urged Kmart to call the police she had done nothing to 
test the rape allegations. Plaintiff had not obtained any 
details from the complainant regarding the allegations, 
had not reviewed surveillance video that might have shed 
light on the veracity of complainant’s allegations, had not 
yet questioned the accused store manager and had not 
explored whether the sexual encounter was consensual.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with Kmart’s decision to 
investigate further before contacting law enforcement is 
not “opposition to conduct made unlawful” under Title VII 
and, to the extent Plaintiff subjectively believed it was, 
her belief was not objectively reasonable as measured 
against existing substantive law. See Little, 103 F.3d at 
960 (affirming summary judgment for employer where 
Plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable belief 
that his complaint constituted opposition to an unlawful 
employment practice). Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish 
that she engaged in statutorily protected activity under 
Title VII or the FCRA.
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Even if the recommendation to contact law enforcement 
constituted protected activity, Plaintiff’s claims would 
still fail because her recommendation occurred during 
the course of the performance of her job as LPDC 
investigating an internal complaint. Although the 
Eleventh Circuit has yet to address this issue, other 
courts have held that a management employee who 
disagrees with or opposes his employer’s decisions is not 
engaging in protected activity if the employee is merely 
performing her job. McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 
1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996) (judgment against personnel 
director who claimed termination was in retaliation for 
reporting overtime violations and informing her employer 
she thought it was at risk for claims by others because she 
was performing her job because she “never crossed the 
line from being an employee merely performing her job 
as personnel director to an employee lodging a complaint 
about the wage and hour practices of her employer and 
asserting a right adverse to the company”); Hagan v. 
Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 630-31 (5th Cir. 
2008)(affirming judgment for employer where manager 
was not personally advocating on behalf of his technicians’ 
statutory rights under the FLSA but merely relayed their 
concerns about their schedules; he did not “step outside the 
role” of manager so as to engage in a protected activity 
under the FLSA); Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 
380 F.Supp.2d 60, 62 (D. P.R. 2005) (rejecting Title VII 
retaliatory discharge claim of human resources director 
who advised the company president and vice-president 
that he was investigating sexual harassment claims 




As the LPDC for the store in question, Plaintiff 
received the complaint and thereafter was assigned to 
investigate same. Plaintiff and Reuter traveled to the 
store, suspended the store manager, and conducted 
interviews of the parties and all fact witnesses. Plaintiffs 
recommendation to summon law enforcement was 
consistent with her investigative authority. The packet 
Johnson emailed to Plaintiff and Reuter specifically 
instructed investigators to consider whether interim 
actions should be taken during an investigation, such as 
“Should the Law Department be involved?” and “Should 
law enforcement be alerted?” (PI. Dep., Exh 2, p. 5.) 
Thus, Plaintiffs recommendation that Kmart contact 
law enforcement was consistent with both her role as an 
investigator in the investigation and Kmart’s written 
investigative guidelines. Because Plaintiff stayed within 
her role of representing Kmart, she was not taking action 
adverse to Kmart.
Plaintiff also claims that Kmart terminated her 
because she “challenged” Kmart’s decision to hide the 
complainant from view of the alleged harasser when 
he arrived at the store to meet with corporate officials. 
Plaintiff cites no record evidence to support this claim, and 
her deposition testimony actually contradicts it. Plaintiff 
testified that she complied with the request to move the 
complainant from the store manager’s view. Additionally, 
Plaintiff has offered no legal authority to establish that 
secluding a complainant from an alleged harasser under 




Plaintiff’s allegation that she “disapproved” of the 
store manager’s alleged rape is meaningless. Plaintiff 
was not reporting something she personally observed at 
Kmart, and she rushed to conclude that the complainant 
had been “raped.” Plaintiff’s implication that those 
involved in the investigation (including the complainant) 
who did not endorse her recommendation to summon 
law enforcement must, therefore, “approve” rape, is 
nonsensical.4
Plaintiff cites Crawford v. Metropolitan Government 
of Nashville and Davidson Division, 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009) 
for the proposition that the “opposition clause,” unlike the 
participation clause, can be triggered even when no EEOC 
claim is pending. Defendant has not argued otherwise. 
In any event, Crawford is factually distinguishable. At 
issue in Crawford was whether a fact witness engaged in 
protected activity when she provided information adverse 
to the employer when questioned during an internal 
harassment investigation. Id. at 850-51. The fact witness 
in Crawford alleged that she herself was subjected to 
harassment by the alleged harasser. Id. Here, Plaintiff 
was not a fact witness reporting facts that she personally 
observed. Rather, Plaintiff was an investigator who 
merely relayed to her superiors secondhand information 
obtained during the investigation. Contrary to Plaintiff’s 
suggestion, Crawford did not address, let alone modify, 
the long line of cases that preclude a finding of protected 
activity when the activity occurs in the course of 
performing one’s job duties.
4. Indeed, Plaintiffs counsel stipulated at oral argument that 
K mart disapproves of rape in the workplace. The Court never 
doubted that such was the case.
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Plaintiff also cites Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Mfg., 617 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010), a post -Crawford decision 
in which the court applied the “manager’s role” standard 
to a plaintiff/scientist’s opposition-based retaliation claim. 
The court concluded that the plaintiff/scientist stepped out 
of his role because he assisted a subordinate with filing and 
pursuing an internal discrimination complaint. Id. at 49. 
The plaintiff/scientist also reported his own observations 
of harassing conduct by the alleged wrongdoer. Id. at 43- 
44. Collazo acknowledged Crawford for its clarification 
as to the types of communication that could constitute 
oppositional activity, but it did not interpret Crawford 
as altering the rule that forecloses oppositional activity 
claims by managers who are simply performing their 
duties. Id. at 42,49.
Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp of Am., 663 F.Supp.2d 
305 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), another case Plaintiff cites, is also 
inapposite. In Schanfield, the court found that the plaintiff/ 
auditor stepped outside his role after he continued to raise 
perceived discriminatory aspects of a rotational system 
after being told not to do so. Id. at 317. As in Collazo, the 
auditor was relaying first-hand information. Id. at 315-16.
Plaintiff was not reporting discriminatory conduct 
that she personally observed. Instead, Plaintiff was simply 
relaying to her superiors the allegations and facts obtained 
from others during the course of her investigation. 






Even if Plaintiff could establish that she engaged 
in statutorily protected activity, her claims would still 
fail because she cannot establish that there was a causal 
connection between her protected activity and her 
termination.
Plaintiff maintains that Pearson told her that she 
was terminated for violation of the policy for conducting 
internal sexual harassment investigations. There is no 
merit to Plaintiffs 14 contention that the necessary causal 
connection is satisfied because Pearson suggested to her 
that she was terminated for violating investigative policy. 
Although there were numerous performance deficiencies 
supporting the decision to terminate, Kmart’s concerns 
about Plaintiffs role in the investigation were unrelated to 
her request to summon law enforcement. The termination 
memorandum, as well as Plaintiff’s sworn testimony, 
makes clear that Kmart was dissatisfied with the manner 
in which the rape allegation surfaced and Plaintiff’s 
apparent indifference to her superiors’ request that she 
provide them with relevant and adequately labeled store 
surveillance footage. These issues relate to Plaintiff’s 
judgment and failure to follow proper investigative 
procedures, which are legitimate business concerns that 
have nothing to do with statutorily protected activity. 
As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a “causal connection” 
between statutorily protected activity and her termination.
Plaintiff’s reliance on her tenure with the Company 
and her removal from her PIP do not establish the
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necessary causal connection. The record reveals that, 
after she was removed from the PIP, Plaintiff reverted 
to the same performance level that led to her PIP in the 
first place. In either event, many of the performance 
deficiencies that led to her termination occurred after 
her role in the investigation ended. These deficiencies, 
therefore, were intervening events that would have broken 
any causal chain between her alleged “protected activity” 
and her termination.
C. Legitimate, Non-Discrim inatory Basis for
Employment Decision
Assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation, Kmart has satisfied its burden of articulating 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its decision to 
terminate Plaintiffs employment. Kmart’s termination 
memorandum identified several performance deficiencies, 
all of which contributed to Plaintiff’s termination of 
employment. Plaintiff admits that time management was 
a challenge for her, which affected her ability to meet 
Kmart’s expectations. Plaintiff ranked among the lowest 
loss prevention coaches in terms of shrink percentages, 
and her inattention to detail and failure to follow up on 
job assignments exposed Kmart to significant exposure. 
Not only did she exhibit questionable judgment in the 
investigation at issue, but she: 1) had unacceptable levels 
of shrink; 2) demonstrated sloppy and unprofessional 
handling and follow up on the placement of a loss 
prevention employee whose background check included 
disqualifying information (for which she was sharply 
criticized by the company’s Human Resources Compliance
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Team); 3) failed to perform adequate store visits; 4) failed 
to train Store LPCs and ensure timely completion of 
corporate initiatives; 5) had poor communication with her 
supervisor; and 6) failed to timely complete a children’s 
toy recall that posed safety risks to children.
D. Pretext
Because Kmart has met its burden of articulating 
legitimate reasons for its decision to terminate, Plaintiff 
is required to establish that Kmart’s stated reasons are 
pretextual. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 
1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (“a plaintiff may not establish that 
an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual merely by 
questioning the wisdom of the employer’s reason, at least 
not where, as here, the reason is one that might motivate 
a reasonable employer”).
Plaintiff cannot establish that Kmart’s reasons are 
pretextual. The performance problems that contributed 
to Plaintiff’s termination arose long before the sexual 
harassment investigation, and those problems were of such 
concern that Kmart placed her on a PIP. Unfortunately, 
Plaintiff failed to maintain an acceptable level of 
performance after she was removed from the PIP. Kmart 
determined that termination was in order because of her 
persistent inattention to detail, “sloppiness,” and time 
management problems.
Further, Kmart’s concerns were not unique to 
Plaintiff. The evidence establishes that Kmart terminated 
at least one other LPDC for similar reasons and had
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been critical of others in the past who did not follow 
proper investigative protocol. Thus, the decisions at issue 
were consistent with Kmart’s past practice. Because 
Plaintiff cannot establish that the reasons supporting 
Kmart’s decision were pretextual, she cannot establish 
an actionable retaliation claim as a matter of law.
Plaintiff maintains that Kmart never discussed 
her performance deficiencies with her. The record does 
not support this contention. Plaintiff does not deny 
the numerous performance problems identified in the 
termination memo, and the record reflects that many, 
if not all, of those issues were communicated to her 
during her employment. Plaintiff, for example, testified 
that she was aware that Kmart officials were very upset 
with her handling of the hiring of an employee who had 
disqualifying information on his record, that Pearson 
was frustrated with her untimely completion of projects 
and that Pearson may likely have spoken with her about 
other concerns, including her failure to ensure her stores 
had removed out-of-date merchandise and the haphazard 
way she conducted her store visits. Many of these issues 
had previously been brought to her attention and were 
documented in her PIP.
Though there are several examples of performance 
deficiencies identified in the record, Plaintiff only defends 
her decision to meet privately with the complainant 
during the investigation. Plaintiff claims that Kmart’s 
investigative policies allowed for private meetings with 
fact witnesses. A more complete examination of the record, 
however, establishes that her decision to meet alone with
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the complainant exhibited poor judgment. Plaintiff, who 
claims that her role was “note-taker” and that she and 
Reuter were taking instruction from Kmart officials 
during the investigation, initiated a private meeting 
with the complainant despite Plaintiff’s acknowledgment 
that she had no experience with sexual harassment 
investigations. Plaintiff’s conduct in the investigation 
contributed to her termination not because of any alleged 
“protected activity,” but because of legitimate concerns 
regarding her failure to follow proper investigative 
technique and poor decision-making. Plaintiff herself has 
terminated Kmart employees for similar reasons.
Plaintiff next attempts to “excuse” herself from 
Kmart’s performance standards because she worked a 
dual territory. Others at Kmart worked dual territories, 
however, and Plaintiff voluntarily accepted the dual 
market because she perceived it as a stepping stone to 
promotion. Moreover, the record establishes that Kmart 
has consistently enforced its performance standards and 
terminated at least one other LPDC for failure to adhere 
to the performance standards.
Plaintiff’s citation to a few favorable comments 
contained in her 2006 performance evaluation does not 
change the result. That Plaintiff’s older evaluations 
included both positive and negative feedback does not 
establish “ inconsistency” in Kmart’s position. The 
inclusion of positive and negative feedback shows that her 
performance evaluations were balanced.
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Plaintiff’s reference to an unrelated case against 
Kmart in Pennsylvania is baffling because she does not 
explain how it is relevant to this case.
Plaintiff’s claim that Kmart was “angry” with her 
uncovering of the alleged rapes also is contradicted by 
her own testimony. Plaintiff testified that, throughout the 
investigative process, those who coordinated and monitored 
the investigation dealt with her in a professional manner 
and did or said nothing Plaintiff found offensive. Plaintiff 
concedes that she probably should have had a witness 
present when she met privately with the complainant 
and was not educated enough to know whether there was 
enough evidence to contact law enforcement. Plaintiff also 
acknowledged that perhaps she failed to appreciate that 
her superiors were doing their jobs and were working 
with a sense of urgency.
Plaintiff’s alleged confusion about Kmart’s position on 
the identity of “the decision- maker” is disingenuous. The 
process for terminating the employment of someone at 
Plaintiff’s level extends across different hierarchal levels. 
Church testified that the termination process for someone 
at Plaintiff’s level incorporates safeguards and multiple 
levels of review. Church explained that Pearson’s decision 
to recommend termination would be reviewed by Arnold, 
who, if she agreed, would approve the termination and 
submit it for review to the corporate team, including Tom 
Arigi and the V.P. of Loss Prevention, Bill Titus. Plaintiff 
fails to explain how this so-called conflict is relevant to 
this case. Kmart does not defend on the ground that the 




As noted, Plaintiff maintains that Pearson told her that 
she was terminated for violation of the policy for conducting 
internal sexual harassment investigations. When Pearson 
spoke with the EEOC and when he subsequently gave 
his declaration to Plaintiff, he acknowledged that Kmart 
had concerns about his performance and already had 
terminated his employment. Pearson’s declaration 
and statements to the EEOC do not constitute party- 
admissions and are therefore not binding on Kmart. See 
F.R.E. 801(d)(2).
Though Pearson now claims that he did not recommend 
Plaintiff’s termination and believes her termination was 
unwarranted, his input and the documents he authored 
formed part of the basis for the decision to terminate 
Plaintiff’s employment. Though Plaintiff claims that some 
of the documents appear “suspect and seemingly altered,” 
or are “bizarre” because written in different tenses, it 
is significant that, in his declaration dated October 21, 
2010, Pearson did not: 1) disavow his authorship of these 
documents; 2) distance himself from the statements and 
representations he made in those documents; or 3) support 
Plaintiff’s unfounded allegations that Kmart “doctored” 
or altered documents -  even though the documents 
were in Plaintiff’s hands long before Pearson signed his 
declaration.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to exclude some of the 
documentary evidence that she otherwise cannot 
overcome. Plaintiff’s claim that she was “blind-sided” by 
certain documents not only lacks substantive merit, but 
she has not explained why she made no issue of these
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documents from the time they were served on August 24, 
2010, to the filing of her Opposition on October 21, 2010. 
If Plaintiff truly believed she was unduly prejudiced by 
these documents, then she should have either filed a timely 
motion to strike and/or sought Kmart’s agreement or, 
alternatively, leave of court, to re-open discovery for the 
limited purposes of conducting any necessary follow-up.
The documents at issue either were duplicative of 
documents previously produced to Plaintiff, not responsive 
to Plaintiff’s discovery and/or add nothing substantive 
to the case. Plaintiff takes issue with Exhibit D to 
Arnold’s declaration, Pearson’s termination memo, but 
that document was previously produced to Plaintiff on 
January 25,2010. Exhibit C to Arnold’s declaration is an 
email from Pearson to Arnold attaching his first draft 
of the termination memo. The draft is not only is less- 
inclusive than the final version of the memo, but Kmart 
voluntarily produced the draft after Church’s deposition 
because it tended to dispel Plaintiff’s suggestion that 
Kmart had created the termination memo after her 
termination on November 20,2007 -  an issue Plaintiff had 
not previously raised in discovery. This document merely 
details Plaintiff’s myriad performance issues. Exhibit E 
to Arnold’s declaration establishes that these performance 
issues were identified prior to Plaintiff’s termination.
Plaintiff’s attempt to exclude comparative data 
identified in Exhibit A to Human Resources Director 
Chris Jemo’s declaration is equally without merit. This 
document summarizes disciplinary action taken against 
Reuter for failure to perform an appropriate investigation,
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merely underscoring that Kmart takes seriously failure 
to follow investigative procedure.
Exhibits A-C to Church’s declaration add nothing 
substantively to the case and were voluntarily produced 
after Church’s deposition simply to clarify issues that 
had arisen during his deposition. These documents 
detail Plaintiff’s performance deficiencies, including her 
failure to follow proper hiring procedure. In either event, 
Church’s attestations in the declaration and the record as 
a whole are more than sufficient to support the entry of 
summary judgment.
The undisputed record evidence establishes that 
Kmart is entitled to summary judgment in this action. 
Plaintiff cannot establish “protected activity” or that 
Kmart’s reasons for its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s 
employment are pretextual. Rather, the facts show 
that Plaintiff was terminated because of performance 
deficiencies that surfaced prior to her alleged protected 
activity and that other associates have been terminated 
for similar reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
THE COURT, being fully advised and having 
considered the pertinent portions of the record, hereby
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that Defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, filed October 1, 2010 [DE 33], is 
GRANTED. It is further
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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs motion 
to strike, filed October 22,2010 [DE 40], is DENIED. Final 
judgment shall be entered by separate order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Chambers in West Palm 
Beach, Florida, this 14th day of January, 2011.
ZsZ____________________________
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APPENDIX C — ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING AND FOR REHEARING EN 
BANC OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 
DATED MAY 31, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





SEARS HOLDING CORPORATION, 
d.b.a. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida
May 31, 2012
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
BEFORE: DUBINA, Chief Judge, FAY and 
KLEINFELD* Circuit Judges.
*Honorable Andrew J. Kleinfeld, United States Circuit 
Judge, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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PER CURIAM:
The petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no Judge 
in regular active service on the Court having requested 
the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition for Rehearing 
En Banc is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
M __________________________________
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